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The problem of truthmakers for negative propositions was introduced by Ber-
trand Russell in 1918. Since then the debate has mostly been concerned with 
whether to accept or reject their existence, and little has been said about what 
it is that makes a negative proposition  negative. This is a problem as it is obvi-
ous that you cannot just read it off from the grammar of a sentence. The aim of 
this paper is to demonstrate that propositions may be negative or positive in 
many ways: it offers a typology, and shows how the question of the existence 
of negative facts will receive a different answer depending on its relationship 
to that typology.
I. Introduction
The modern discussion of negative facts was initiated by Russell in his famous 
lectures at Harvard in 1914 and in London in 1918, of which the latter have 
come down to us in written form as The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. The 
main focus has, undoubtedly, been the question of whether negative facts, as 
truthmakers for negative propositions, really “exist.” By contrast, it is less easy 
to find philosophers of note who are equally engaged by the issue of what, 
exactly, a negative proposition really is, or what meaning it has – let alone any 
who have actually sought to develop a theory about this. Most often they seem 
to largely take this aspect for granted. The reason for this may be that the ex-
amples they make use of – most frequently Russell’s own (‘There is not a hip-
popotamus in this room’, ‘This chalk is not red’, and the like) – do not seem 
problematic in this respect: at least, not at first glance. 
Russell himself, though, surely did recognise that there could be a problem 
here. At the end of the third lecture in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, we 
can read the following exchange:
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Question: “Does putting the ‘not’ into it [i.e. the statement] give it a formal character of 
negative and vice versa?” Mr. Russell: “No, I think you must go into the meaning of the 
words.” Question: “What is precisely your test as to whether you have got a positive or 
negative proposition before you?” Mr. Russell: “There is no formal test.” (Russell 1956, 
215)
Nevertheless, as far as I am aware, he does not develop the point. Yet he does 
maintain that:
In the perfect logical language that I sketched in theory [i.e. the language of logical atom-
ism], it would always be obvious at once whether a proposition was positive or negative. 
(1956, 215)
As is well known, however, he never did develop that language to a point 
where it became “obvious.” 
Molnar is one of the few significant writers to have subsequently attempted 
to define negative truths. He admits that “[one] cannot identify negative state-
ments with negated statements since some unnegated statements are logically 
equivalent to statements in which negation occurs essentially. … [s]ome pred-
icates are implicitly negative” (Molnar 2000, 72). Molnar’s examples are 
‘blind’ and ‘deaf’. From this (correct) observation it follows that a negated 
statement may be positive. His position is that there are “essentially positive 
properties” (2000, 73), and the negations of the expressions which refer to 
them will be essentially negative propositions. But he does not formulate a 
criterion, let alone a theory, of what makes a predicate “essentially positive.” 
He merely admits that one needs a theory and, interestingly enough, “a theory 
that cannot be formulated on purely a priori grounds.”
 In the following I shall first try to account for the nature of the prob-
lem, sketching the kinds of condition that any potential solution should be ex-
pected to satisfy. Next I shall try to provide such a solution by showing that 
negative propositions may, in fact, be negative in a variety of different ways. 
In the course of so doing I shall also attempt to outline a typology of these.
II. The great confusion
What is it, then, that makes a negative proposition negative? According to 
common usage a negative proposition is a proposition that is expressed by a 
negative sentence. The negativity is simply projected from the grammatical 
form of a sentence in natural language. However, you need not dig far beneath 
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the surface to recognise that this procedure won’t do. Consider the sentences 
(a) ‘Pierre is ill’, (b) ‘Pierre is not ill’, (c) ‘Pierre is healthy’ and (d) ‘Pierre is 
not healthy’. Here the positive proposition (a) has the same meaning as the 
negative proposition (d), and the negative proposition (b) has the same mean-
ing as the positive proposition (c). Either (a) and (d) are true, or (b) and (c) are 
true – but which truths are positive, and which are negative? In a very impor-
tant sense ‘Pierre is ill/not healthy’ is negative and ‘Pierre is healthy/not ill’ is 
positive. But this calls for an analysis of the sort we are going to make in the 
third section. So far we may just observe that grammar does not help. ‘Pierre is 
ill’ and ‘Pierre is healthy’ spell out a pair of “positive contradictories”: they are 
grammatically positive, but take opposite truth-values. Language is full of 
these: ‘the room is clean’ and ‘the room is dirty’, ‘the door is open’ and ‘the 
door is closed’, ‘Pierre is bald’ and ‘Pierre has hair on his head’, etc. The struc-
ture, of course, does not just occur in propositions expressed in terms of subject 
and predicate. It also holds, for example, for ‘it is a day of rest’ and ‘it is a 
working day’, for ‘there is peace in Europe’ and ‘there is war in Europe’, etc. 
And whether or not, in a particular language (say English), there is a term or an 
expression ‘R’ such that ‘S is R’ has the same meaning as ‘S is not P’, accord-
ingly making ‘S is P’ and ‘S is R’ into a pair of positive contradictories may, in 
many cases, be a matter of vocabulary or of linguistic imagination: i.e. a con-
tingent matter.1 
The analytical application of the concept of contradictory predicates calls 
for further elucidation. A proposition like ‘The King of Athens is not bald’, 
with a non-existent subject, is, according to Aristotle, true, according to Rus-
sell, false, and according to Strawson, without any truth-value at all. Similar 
problems appear with propositions like ‘this chalk is not bald’, where the pred-
icate can’t be meaningfully assigned to the subject. From this it follows that 
there is no universal agreement about whether (i) ‘S is P’ and (ii) ‘S is not P’ 
are formally contradictory or merely contrary propositions. But ‘Pierre is bald’ 
and ‘Pierre is not bald’ (Pierre being a living person) are genuine contradicto-
ries: they do necessarily take opposite truth-values. The existence of S and the 
logical possibility of ‘S is P’ are necessary – and, as far as I can see, sufficient 
– conditions for ‘S is not P’ being contradictory to ‘S is P’, saving the Law of 
Excluded Middle for internal negation. Let’s call them the XP-conditions (as in 
“subject-eXists-predication-Possible”). We may put it this way:
¬(S is P) ∧ S exists ∧ ‘S is P’ is logically possible  ⇔  S is not P 2
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In all the examples in this article it will be presupposed that the XP-conditions 
are fulfilled. 
Many negative predications are not made negative by our adding a negating 
operator to a positive predicate, but are “born” negative by having a negative 
prefix like ‘un-’, ‘in-’, ‘non-’, ‘dis-’, etc. This may offer a clue, but not a crite-
rion. Would we, for instance, consider ‘unspoiled’ as negative and ‘spoiled’ as 
positive, if we were not led – or misled – by grammar to think so? May ‘cer-
tain’ be positive at the same time as ‘indubitable’ is negative? Very often the 
term with the negative prefix is merely contrary, not contradictory to the posi-
tive term: a person who is not happy need not be unhappy. Sometimes a predi-
cate may be provided with more than one negative prefix, resulting in different 
meanings. Compare ‘disinterested’ and ‘uninterested’, ‘disorganised’ and ‘un-
organised’, or ‘disarranged’ and ‘unarranged’. Sometimes there is no corre-
sponding positive predicate, constituted by the absence of the prefix. A child 
that is not “mischievous” is not “chievous” but “well-behaved.” (And which of 
them is actually the positive/negative predicate? Is the well-behaved child 
characterised by the absence of “mischievousness.” or is the mischievous child 
characterised by the absence of “being well-behaved”?) Being “nonchalant” is 
not the negation of being “chalant.” Sometimes the predicate with a negating 
operator does not have the same meaning as the negation of the predicate. A 
man may be infamous and famous at the same time. A man who is not “indif-
ferent” is not – by double negation – “different.” A non-profit organisation is 
not the same as an organisation (such as a business) that makes no profit. ‘A 
likes B’ contradicts ‘A does not like B’, but is contrary to ‘A dislikes B’.
This is confusing, so it still remains to say, perhaps by way of consolation, 
that in many cases a grammatically positive predicate will not and, I think, can-
not be contradictory to another positive predicate. A proposition stating that a 
certain object is located at a certain place L0 cannot – as a rule – be contradic-
tory to a proposition stating without the use of a negative operator or prefix that 
the object is not at L0. That would presuppose that we had as many positive 
propositions, each contradicting a positive reference to something’s being lo-
cated somewhere, as there are – i.e. as we might construct – positive references 
to something’s being located somewhere. If my book is not on my table, that 
would call for one predicate, if it is not under my bed, that would call for an-
other, etc. The same holds for all forms of quantification: ‘This stone is not 23 
kilograms in weight’, ‘the distance is not 273 metres’, etc. And it holds, as a 
rule, for propositions stating that an event did take place versus propositions 
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stating that it did not take place, for colour predicates, and for many other types 
of predicate too. 
We may conclude that there is a distinction between a proposition being 
grammatically positive/negative and its being “really” or, as we shall say, on-
tologically positive/negative. That distinction forms one of the principal sub-
jects of this article. 
III. The negativity of propositions
If we don’t want to relinquish the distinction between positive and negative 
propositions as largely arbitrary – which most of us would be intuitively reluc-
tant to do – then we must explain what it is, exactly, that constitutes the nega-
tivity of a negative proposition insofar as this can’t simply be read off from the 
grammar of the proposition itself. There is no alternative but to do the analyti-
cal job, from sentence to sentence, concept to concept, in order to decide what 
actually is – i.e. ought to count as – a negative or positive proposition.  
A positive proposition states that something is the case, and a negative prop-
osition states that something is not the case.3 But as we have seen, where that 
distinction is applied to particular propositions grammar does not furnish us 
with adequate criteria. A proposition may be grammatically positive (abbrevi-
ated ‘G-positive’) and yet be – so we shall put it – ontologically negative (ab-
breviated ‘O-negative’). ‘Pierre is blind’ is an example. Or it may be gram-
matically negative (‘G-negative’) and yet be ontologically positive (O-posi-
tive). ‘Pierre is not blind’ is an example. And even when a proposition is G-
positive and O-positive at the same time, or is G-negative and O-negative at the 
same time, it is so for different reasons. ‘Socrates is not alive’ is G-negative 
merely by the presence and function of ‘not’, whereas its being O-negative 
depends on the meaning of ‘alive’ and what it means to be alive. 
My thesis is that propositions may be O-positive/negative in many ways, 
according to different criteria. They may be negative in a “sheer” sense (see 
below), or they may have different sorts of “ontological valence.” For exam-
ple, ‘Pierre missed the train’ is O-negative – it has a negative valence – accord-
ing to a criterion that we may call failing (i.e. failing versus succeeding), and 
‘Pierre is bald’ is O-negative – it has a negative valence – according to a crite-
rion that we may call missing an attribute (missing versus not-missing an at-
tribute). Elaborating a range of such ontological valences will be the principal 
aim for the remainder of this section. 
67083-Danish Yearbook 47.indd   91 12/03/15   13.07
92 Carl erik kühl
As regards the nomenclature of ontological valences, I shall mainly coin 
their designations in negative terms: as ‘absent’, ‘deficient’, ‘dysfunctional’, 
‘missing’, etc. The simplest reason for this is that in many cases there is no ap-
propriate term for the positive valence. Is there, for instance, a positive term 
that may be substituted for ‘not missing’ in the sentence ‘the book is not miss-
ing from the shelf’? The sentence ‘the book is on the shelf’ is not sufficient. It 
should be added that the book also has its place there. I think it is hard to imag-
ine a language where this could be different. Abnormalities – ways things may 
be out of order – are discovered/invented every day. You may be paedophile, 
canophile, P1-ophile, P2-ophile … Pn-ophile. The predicate ‘sexually normal’ is 
only contrary to each of these, not contradictory. Could you imagine a lan-
guage in which each new sexual abnormality produced a new term for the cor-
respondingly specific state of normality?4
IV. Sheer negativity
Before entering upon the presentation of specific types of ontological valence 
we need to introduce a concept: that of sheer negativity. Consider these exam-
ples: 
(1) There is not a hippopotamus in this room.
(2) This chalk is not red. 
(3) A does not love B.5 
Each of these propositions asserts or is meant to assert that a certain (sort of an) 
object is not located at a certain place, and just that, or that it does not have a 
certain property, and just that, or that it is not related to a certain other object in 
a certain way, and just that. They all maintain the absence of something – a 
hippopotamus in a room, the redness of the chalk, A’s loving B – without 
thereby maintaining the presence of something else. 
In the case of (1), the proposition states – or is meant to state – nothing more 
about hippopotami (or about the room) than it would minimally state about any 
object capable of being in that room. It is simply an instance of ‘There is not an 
X in this room’. Roughly, the only thing presupposed about the object would 
be its size. The proposition maintains the sheer absence of hippopotami in the 
room without implicitly maintaining the presence of something else. As re-
gards (2), the proposition states nothing more about the chalk than what it 
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would minimally state about any object capable of being red. It is simply an 
instance of ‘X is not red’. The proposition maintains the sheer absence of red-
ness with respect to that chalk, without implicitly maintaining the presence of 
something else. Clearly, if a coloured object is not red – and only coloured 
objects may not be red – then it must have some other specific colour. But the 
proposition does not state which one. There is no positive property called ‘oth-
er-than-redness’. By contrast, ‘that traffic light is not red’ is not just negative 
in the sheer sense, since the absence of redness as assigned to the traffic light 
constitutes part of the actual conditions that bear on the activity of traffic. In 
(3), A and B are meant to be arbitrary, i.e. conceptually no more specific than 
is necessary to make the proposition conceptually well-formed. A and B are 
supposed to be human beings,6 but nothing is presupposed about whether or 
not they even know each other. The proposition maintains the sheer absence of 
love on the part of A, in relation to B, without maintaining the presence of 
some other relationship between them. However, if we write ‘This man A does 
not love his wife B’, the negation is more than just a sheer negation, as the 
absence of love in a marriage stands out “positively” as being a feature of that 
marriage.
Propositions (1)–(3) are O-negative in the most attenuated sense. The point, 
then, is that propositions may be negative in a more “substantial” sense, ac-
cording to which the absence of something implies – or simply constitutes – 
the presence of something else. That is the essential feature of propositions that 
have an ontological valence.
A proposition like ‘X is not red’, as we saw, is negative in the sheer sense 
when ‘X’ takes the value ‘this chalk’, but becomes “loaded” with an ontologi-
cal valence when the value is ‘this traffic light’. Similarly, ‘A does not love B’ 
is negative in the sheer sense when ‘A’ and ‘B’ are proper names or definite 
descriptions like ‘the president of the United States’ and ‘my grandmother’, 
whereas it takes a negative valence when ‘A’ and ‘B’ are further specified as 
‘this man A’ and ‘his wife B’. However, in some cases the option of sheer 
negativity does not apply. ‘A is not married’ never merely spells out the ab-
sence of a contracted marriage. No matter who A is, or how he/she is referred 
to, the married and the unmarried person do each of them have a “positively” 
assigned marital status implying the presence of certain civil rights, and also 
certain civil, and perhaps moral, obligations. Similarly, when a hippopotamus 
is absent from some place there is not eo ipso something present “instead of” 
the hippopotamus.7 But when peace is absent from some place, something is 
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present: war. Whenever and wherever there is war, there is not peace, and 
whenever and wherever there is not war, there is peace, so ‘there is war’ and 
‘there is peace’ make a pair of contradictories. Even though peace and war are, 
“positively.” two forms of human social life, this does not affect the view that 
peace constitutes a kind of default or “natural” state of affairs, implying that 
war then constitutes a deficiency.8
V. Ontological valences
Now let’s take a closer look at ontological valences.
O1. ‘Absence as Deficiency’: 
(4) There is not a blackboard in this lecture room.
The room is still the room in which Russell is lecturing, and the proposition 
spells out the sheer absence of a blackboard in the same way as the proposition 
‘there is not a hippopotamus in this room” spelled out the sheer absence of a 
hippopotamus. But there is more to it. In the lecture room the absence of the 
board will also give rise to an O-negative proposition according to a criterion 
that we may here call absence as deficiency, in the specific mode of dysfunc-
tionality. A lecture room, to be fully functional as such, must include a board. 
But there is no board in the room. The absence of the board means the presence 
of practical obstacles. When X becomes deficient on account of the absence of 
Y, then X is missing Y – in one sense of that word.
Right now there is no water either on the island of Sardinia or on Jupiter. But 
the absence of water on Sardinia makes the crops wither: i.e. water is missing 
there. Here the absence of water means the presence of drought. Insofar as 
there is no life on Jupiter, there cannot be drought. Drought implies the pres-
ence of something suffering from the absence of water.
Drought, as we have defined it, means the absence of water in the mode of 
being missing. However, at a sufficiently low level of physical description it 
will lose that ontological valence, and even the term ‘absence’ will disappear 
from the account. The physiochemical processes going on, were there to be 
H2O, we may call P1; the processes going on in the absence of H2O we shall 
call P2. Both are described and explained in terms of the present components 
and their interaction. The absence of H2O does not occur in any chemical for-
mula.9 But the moment you switch from the lowest level to a level where a 
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concept of life (even in the most primitive form) is introduced, P2 is what hap-
pens when a vital condition for life is not fulfilled.10 You get the absence of 
something as something “missing”: there was no H2O, so the plant withered. 
The withering of the plant was partly a consequence – if you don’t like to say 
‘effect’ – of the absence of water.11 
In most cases of deficiency/dysfunction there is a radical variant that we may 
call obstruction/preventing.
(5) There is no light in this lecture room (= This room is dark).
Russell may have his difficulties in lecturing in a room with no board. But he 
would be entirely prevented, if there were no light – either natural or artificial. 
This is “missing” as “obstruction by absence.” X is prevented from doing Z by 
the absence of Y.
Now consider this example:
(6) Pierre [with whom I have an appointment] is not in the room.
This time the room is a café, and Jean-Paul Sartre has an appointment with 
Pierre to meet him there at four o’clock. Entering the café some minutes later 
he casts a glance across the room, only to see that Pierre is absent from his 
usual place. Neither Paul Valéry, nor Lord Wellington, nor a hippopotamus, is 
in the room, but Pierre is absent in a more substantial sense. We may consider 
it to be an example of deficiency by absence. Yet Pierre’s absence is not a de-
ficiency of the room, of its inventory, etc., but, rather, of the situation – that of 
two persons being supposed to meet each other by appointment. The absence 
of Pierre makes it a situation of the type Sartre calls an “existential absence.”12 
The board is missing whether or not there is somebody in the room failing to 
see it and being prevented from using it. It belongs essentially to the stock of 
the room. The room may be deficient with respect to the absence of a table, 
lamp, and so on. Yet Pierre, by contrast, is not “missing” from the room. (May-
be Jean-Paul misses Pierre, but that is not constitutive of the existential ab-
sence.)  
Had there been an appointment between twenty-eight former classmates to 
meet that afternoon for a chat, with Pierre and Jean-Paul being just two of 
them, then Pierre’s absence would still have made the situation deficient, but 
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the deficiency would not have been radical: i.e. it would not have prevented the 
session from taking place. However, when the appointment is solely between 
Pierre and Jean-Paul this is the case.
(7)  Pierre is hungry (= Pierre is not satisfied)
Granted that Pierre exists and belongs to the kind of entities whose appetite for 
food may be satisfied, ‘Pierre is hungry’ and ‘Pierre is satisfied’ are contradic-
tory propositions: i.e. there is a one-word predicate for whatever we may take 
to be the positive or the negative property, respectively. There is nothing dys-
functional about being hungry. That’s exactly the difference, I think, between 
being hungry and starving. But when you are hungry you are still longing for 
(and consequently looking, aiming, working or even fighting for) something 
that you are thus presently in need of and, in that sense, missing: food. ‘Pierre 
is hungry’ is, therefore, an O1-negative proposition.
 Similarly, ‘Pierre is ill’ is O1-negative, because illness means a living 
organism being dysfunctional.
O2. ‘Presence as Deficiency’:
In the previous examples the ontological negativity was a matter of the absence 
of something. Now let us compare that with the following:
(8) This room is not clean (= This room is dirty)
A clean room is a room without dirt, better suited to the use that we make of the 
room as a room – as a lecture room, living room, dining room, study – and 
something which we take care of by cleaning and keeping clean. This time the 
presence of something, dirt, makes the proposition O-negative in terms of de-
ficiency or dysfunction.13
The proposition ‘Pierre has a tumour’ asserts the presence of something: the 
tumour. But having a tumour means to suffer from an illness – the living organ-
ism being dysfunctional – so the proposition is O2-negative, whereas ‘Pierre 
has no tumour’ is an O2-positive proposition. 
 
(9)  The road is blocked by a rock
67083-Danish Yearbook 47.indd   96 12/03/15   13.07
 the negativity of negative ProPoSitionS 97
The proposition ‘there is a rock on the road’ is positive in the sheer sense. But 
when it is further spelled out that the rock is blocking the road, then the propo-
sition becomes O2-negative. The road-users are prevented from something by 
the presence of something.
O3. ‘Disorder as Deficiency’:
(10)  This picture on the wall is awry (= This picture on the wall is not 
straight) 
If we take it as a premise that the picture in question, in virtue of its kind, is 
meant to hang straight, then hanging awry is a negative predicate in terms of 
deficiency/dysfunction. But the dysfunction is not – in any plain sense – con-
stituted by the absence of something that essentially ought to be there, nor by 
the presence of something that essentially ought not to be there. In absolutely 
general terms one might say that there is an “absence of order.” But when Rus-
sell’s lecture room is deficient in examples (4) and (5), it is because of the ab-
sence of something (i.e. the board or the light), whereas when the picture is 
awry, the deficiency is the absence of something: order. It is also arbitrary 
whether you assign the deficiency to the picture or to the arrangement.
 ‘The knife is blunt’, ‘his/her heart is beating irregularly’, ‘Pierre is 
short-sighted’ are examples of O3-negative propositions in the mode of some-
thing being “out of order.” But if the knife is broken, it can’t be used at all, and 
if Pierre is blind he is entirely prevented from seeing. These exemplify the 
radical variant of disorder: obstruction/prevention by/as disorder. 
O4. ‘Missing/Lacking an Attribute’:
(11) Pierre is bald
Now back to baldness and not-baldness. Pierre is neither the King of France 
nor a piece of chalk but an actually living human being. But having hair on 
one’s head is a human attribute, and an absent attribute is a missing attribute. 
(Even if a person has not lost his hair but has lived his whole life without hair, 
he would still be bald.) In this case the “missing” or “lacking” does not refer to 
something as being dysfunctional. Whatever the function of hair may be, it is 
not that function we are referring to when we say that somebody is bald. Some 
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humans have hair on their upper arms, others do not. But an absence of hair 
there is not a case of hair being missing there, as having hair present on the 
upper arm is not a property that humans have just qua being human: i.e. it is not 
a human attribute. Also, when a child has lost its milk teeth, it does not then 
lack them. But when an adult loses a wisdom tooth – or maybe never comes to 
have it – he will lack it. 
‘Pierre is bald’ is an example of a radically negative variant of O4. If we in-
troduce, within the category of having hair on one’s head, the dichotomy ‘lack-
ing (some) hair on one’s head /not lacking hair on one’s head’, then the “soft” 
negative variant will be ‘Pierre is thin-haired’.
O5. ‘Failing’:
(12) Pierre’s flute playing is out of tune 14
Whenever human practical life is involved there is – explicitly or implicitly – 
an absolutely basic ontological criterion in play, which we shall call O5: failing 
and succeeding. When Pierre is playing out of tune, something – the playing, 
the music – is out of order, so the truth of an O3-negative proposition is im-
plied. But Pierre playing out of tune also means, in an even more basic sense, 
Pierre failing to play in tune. In examples (4), (5) and (8), it is the room as a site 
for various kinds of human activity that makes the absence of a board, or of 
light, or the presence of dirt, negative: the activities fail, or face the threat of 
failure, or have less than optimal conditions for success. In these examples O1- 
and O2-negativity depend on O5-negativity.  
According to the Kenny-Vendler classificatory scheme for action types (or 
action verbs), ‘playing the flute’ counts as an activity (Vendler 1953; Kenny 
1963; see also Kühl 2008). It may be defined in different ways, the most basic 
characterisation probably being inferential: any moment in which it is true that 
you are playing is a moment in which you have played (i.e. have been playing 
for a while).15 Failing in the performance of an activity means performing it in 
a deficient way. 
The second action type is accomplishment (Vendler) or performance (Ken-
ny): 
(13)  Pierre [who took lessons in flute playing] did not learn to play the 
flute. 
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Here it holds that any moment in which it is true that Pierre is learning to play 
the flute is a moment in which he has not (yet) learned to play the flute: failing 
in the project or performance of learning means failing to accomplish the learn-
ing. 
The third action type is called achievement (by Vendler): 
(14) Pierre did not find his flute.
(14) implies that Pierre had a flute and, on the occasion in question, didn’t 
know where it was, but tried to find it. But whatever Pierre actually did in order 
to find his flute, there is one thing he failed to do: find it. Failing in the perfor-
mance of an achievement means failing to achieve the projected end.
 
There may be other ontological criteria for a proposition being O-positive or 
O-negative. And there are certainly other types of proposition that we have not 
analysed as regards ontological valences: truth-functions, general propositions, 
modal propositions, etc. All this points towards a need for further discussion, 
which may well call for additional analytical tools. Yet, at the same time, this 
would certainly exceed the scope of the present paper, whose basic concern is 
just to demonstrate how an ontological discourse about the negativity and pos-
itivity of propositions, such as is necessary if we are to arrive at a properly 
nuanced verdict concerning the nature of negative facts, makes sense. On the 
other hand, even if we stay with singular propositions and the ontological cri-
teria already so far introduced, there are a few further observations that ought 
to be made. 
Let’s begin with a remark concerning “contextual valence.” Consider the 
following:
(15) Pierre did not play the flute
Without a context I think this is a negative proposition, in the sheer sense of 
‘negative’. But we may easily imagine a context in which the flute-playing was 
more than just absent and, with this, how the meaning of the proposition, and 
accordingly the presence/absence of ontological valences, might change with 
the context of utterance.  Imagine an orchestral rehearsal where Pierre is per-
forming the flute part and misses the entrance at bar 238. In that context (15) 
will be – or may be spelled out as – an O5-negative statement. Or imagine that 
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a bit later on in the score there is an interval in the flute part, and Pierre does 
make the pause. This makes (15) an O5-positive statement
Now let us proceed to a remark concerning what I would like to call “dy-
namic paraphrasing.” When propositions occur in pairs of contradictories 
there may also be propositions stating the transition or change from a positive 
valence to the corresponding negative valence, or vice versa. A proposition 
stating a transition from a positive to a negative valence will itself then take on 
a negative one, whereas a proposition stating a transition from a negative to a 
positive valence will then take on a positive one. The transition from negative 
to positive in the sheer sense (e.g. from ‘there is not a hippopotamus in this 
room’ to ‘there is a hippopotamus in the room’, where this amounts to the same 
thing as ‘a hippopotamus entered the room’) is, in itself, an ontologically posi-
tive proposition in the sheer sense, whereas the transition from positive to neg-
ative (e.g. ‘the hippopotamus left the room’) is, in itself, an ontologically nega-
tive one, also in the sheer sense. This may hold in principle for all types of 
ontological valence: ‘Pierre has a tumour’ is, let’s recall, an O2-negative prop-
osition, the presence of the tumour constituting a deficiency, whereas ‘Pierre 
does not have a tumour’ is O2-positive. The proposition ‘Pierre does not have 
a tumour any longer’ accordingly becomes a dynamically O2-positive proposi-
tion, whereas ‘Pierre has got [i.e. has developed] a tumour’ will be a dynami-
cally O2-negative one. It should, moreover, be noted that the reason why the 
end (or telos) of such a transition takes on a positive or a negative valence is 
also the reason why the transition itself takes on, respectively, a positive or a 
negative valence. 
Where the ontological criterion of failing is concerned, especially, the va-
lences may be positive and negative at the same time, depending on the vary-
ing enterprises and perspectives of different agents. This gives rise to such 
“dialectical variants” as the following: 
(16) The level-crossing barrier is down
The barrier being down prevents the cars from passing over the level-crossing 
(O2- and O5-negative), at the same time as giving the train leave to do so (O2- 
and O5-positive).  
If there is light, you may manage to see things, but not to hide. If there is no 
light, you may manage to hide, but not to see.
When a passenger is sitting on a seat in a bus, the seat is in use [by him], as 
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opposed to not in use [by him], and he succeeds in having a comfortable trip. 
But from the perspective of other passengers, the seat is occupied as opposed 
to vacant. 
In Ex. 9 ‘The road is blocked by a rock’ was, as we saw, an O-negative 
proposition, since the block was preventing road-users from getting through. 
But the rock may have been put there by highwaymen, who have thus suc-
ceeded in preventing the road-users from getting through, making the proposi-
tion O-positive instead. Yet things are now becoming complicated – as compli-
cated as daily life.
(17) The door to the room is locked.
If Pierre wants to enter by the door and does not possess the key, he will fail to 
do so if the door is locked, but succeed if it is unlocked. In that context ‘the 
door is locked’ is an O-negative proposition, ‘the door is unlocked’ an O-pos-
itive one. On the other hand, when the door is locked people who possess the 
key may succeed in preventing those who do not from entering by the door, 
whereas if it is unlocked, they may fail to do so. In such a context the first 
proposition gives rise to an O-positive proposition, the second to an O-negative 
one.
VI. The meanings of ‘The meaning of a negative or positive proposition’ 
This whole discussion has been aimed at addressing the issue of what makes a 
negative proposition negative. So the propositions we study should be deemed 
negative and their specific mode of negativity should be read off from the 
meaning of the proposition. The majority of the examples work well this way. 
The negative valence is embedded in the meaning of the predicate (‘Pierre is 
bald’, ‘Pierre’s flute playing is out of tune’, etc.), or it follows from its meaning 
insofar as it is negated (‘the room is not clean’, ‘Pierre did not find his flute’, 
etc.), or it follows from the meaning of the subject and the predicate in their 
specific configuration (‘the picture on the wall is awry’). 
But what about an example like (4): ‘There is not a blackboard in this lecture 
room’? One might argue that this proposition simply asserts the sheer absence 
of a blackboard from the room exactly as (1) (‘There is not a hippopotamus in 
this lecture room’) asserts the sheer absence of a hippopotamus from the same 
room. The deficiency – the presence of practical obstacles in (4) – is a conse-
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quence or effect of the fact and is not implied by the meaning of the proposi-
tion. The proposition itself has no ontological valence. If one were still to talk 
about a “negative ontological valence” here, it would have to be assigned to the 
fact, without being assigned to the proposition.
I think this is wrong. The meaning of a sentence, and of the words in that 
sentence, is what you must minimally understand when you understand the 
sentence. But you have not understood the meaning of the word ‘blackboard’, 
or the expression ‘a blackboard in a lecture room’, if you don’t understand 
what it means for a blackboard to be in a lecture room – i.e. the use of it, its 
function, what it is “good for.”  (It is not sufficient just to be able to classify 
objects as being or not being blackboards.) But when you have understood 
these terms as they are brought together in the proposition ‘there is not a black-
board in this lecture room’, then you have also understood – on the level of 
semantics, you may say, if you so wish – the proposition as stating a deficien-
cy.16 
Similarly in (5): ‘There is no light in this room [where I am lecturing]’. If 
you don’t have a certain minimal understanding of the meaning of lecturing in 
a lecture room, and of what the absence of light means for such an activity, 
then you have not understood the very meaning of the proposition. On the 
other hand, when you have that minimal understanding, then you have also 
recognised the deficiency: i.e. you have recognised the proposition as being 
O1-negative. Compare this with a proposition like (8*): ‘There is no light in 
this room (where I’m hiding)’. When you have in place the minimal under-
standing (of how the presence of light relates to the project of hiding) necessary 
to understand the meaning of that proposition, you just have also recognised 
the proposition as being O2-positive.  
Take the example ‘There is no water in my flower garden’, which I claim to 
be O2-negative (“presence as deficiency”). Imagine somebody who rejects the 
proposition, pointing at a full water-container in the corner of the garden: 
“There is water in the container, and the container is in the garden, so there is 
water in the garden.” Clearly, he has not understood the meaning of the propo-
sition. ‘There is no water in the garden’ means that the soil is dry, and this is 
what I tell him. Let us say that he then goes on to argue as follows: “There will 
always be some water down there, the soil will never be entirely dry. So how 
dry is the soil in your flower garden when you say that it is dry?” Unless he gets 
an answer to that question, he has still not understood the original proposition. 
Even so, I don’t think I can give him an answer that does not spell out ‘dry’ – in 
67083-Danish Yearbook 47.indd   102 12/03/15   13.07
 the negativity of negative ProPoSitionS 103
this context – in terms of a deficiency of water. Yet the soil per se cannot be 
deficient in water: if you believe that, you have not understood the meaning of 
the expression ‘dry soil’. Something in the soil must be deficient in water, in-
sofar as the soil can be said to be deficient in water. It might be insects or 
worms, it may be plants – you name it. But since it is spelled out here in a 
proposition about a flower garden, let us take it as pertaining by contextual 
implication to the plants there. Our point is that he has not really understood 
the sentence until he has understood this, and in this way the deficiency turns 
out to be a feature of the meaning of the proposition, too – thus making it an 
O1-negative proposition. You may put it this way: ‘There is no water in my 
flower garden, therefore the plants lack water’ is an entailment rather than a 
statement of a causal relationship – or, at least, it sits on the borderline between 
these.     
I wouldn’t say that a man doesn’t know the meaning of the word ‘flower’ or 
the expression ‘flower garden’ if he doesn’t know that flowers need water and 
get it from the soil, but I would insist that he doesn’t know the meaning of the 
sentence ‘there is no water in my flower garden’ (where, as we’ve said, this 
amounts to saying that ‘the soil in my flower garden is deficient in water’). 
Clearly, by no means is it the case that all negativities in this world may be 
spelled out as analytical truths. Most of them – unfortunately, perhaps – can-
not. ‘Pierre’s body temperature is 45 degrees centigrade’ and ‘Pierre has a high 
fever’ may relate to the same “negative fact.” but only the latter is a negative 
proposition in the sense that it takes on a negative ontological valence. The 
first simply assigns a certain property to a certain subject: it is positive in the 
sheer sense. Alternatively, let us say that there is a hippopotamus in this lecture 
room. That will be an obstacle for anyone involved in a lecture there, but this 
does not follow from the truth of the proposition ‘there is a hippopotamus in 
this lecture room’. The minimal knowledge or understanding of hippopotami, 
lecturing, lecture rooms, of hippopotami in lecture rooms, etc., that you neces-
sarily have insofar as you understand the meaning of the sentence, does not 
imply that you understand why it constitutes an obstacle. It is, to be sure, easy 
to explain the latter, but it is not, nevertheless, a matter of pure semantics in the 
sense of being embedded in the meaning of the sentence itself. Here the propo-
sition itself has no ontological valence. 
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VII. Problems with ontological valences 
Let’s recapitulate the argument so far: if you have strong opinions on negative 
facts as truthmakers for negative assertions – i.e. you don’t “believe in them” 
– then you must find some alternative basis for distinguishing between positive 
and negative propositions. You must have a criterion, or a set of criteria, and 
ideally you should be able to apply them in all cases. But these criteria cannot 
be grammatical, most obviously because a grammatically negative proposition 
will very often have the same meaning as a grammatically positive proposition. 
If you want to arrive at a properly qualified opinion regarding the existence of 
negative facts you must develop – and apply – other criteria, be it the principle 
of sheer negativity or something worked out in terms of ontological valences. 
I think this is what many writers intuitively do when dealing with the subject 
and I have tried to demonstrate, or at least illustrate, how such intuitions could 
be made explicit in a discourse. Undoubtedly there are a variety of problems 
involved in this approach, but I shall mention just two.
The first problem is that of “ambivalent contradictories.” An O-negative 
proposition always presupposes an O-positive proposition to negate, and vice 
versa. Just compare ‘this monkey is “a he”’ with ‘this monkey is “a she”’. If 
the monkey is “a he.” it is not “a she.” and if it is not “a he.” it is “a she.” so the 
propositions are contradictory. But which of them is positive, and which is 
negative?17 Aren’t both of them positive, in fact? In that case we have to admit 
that there are cases where the negation of an O-positive proposition doesn’t 
create an O-negative proposition. Or should we rather accept that there are 
cases where it does not make sense to use the signs in question? Compare, also, 
‘the temperature is above 10 degrees centigrade’, and ‘the temperature is 10 
degrees centigrade or below’. Is night the absence of day, or day the absence of 
night? Is sameness the absence of difference, or is difference the absence of 
sameness? The examples are legion.
Compare, also, the propositions ‘Pierre is in pain’ and ‘Pierre is not in pain’. 
Which is positive, which negative? Here, and in many other cases, it may help 
to clarify matters if we supplement the categories of grammatical and onto-
logical valence with that of experiential valence. In all languages that I know 
of we have no possibility of converting the second proposition into a gram-
matically positive one.18 This is not an ontological argument, but it may be a 
matter of how we learn to use the concepts. Adam and Eve didn’t know from 
the beginning that they were free of pain, and even The Lord would have had 
his difficulties in explaining it to them, had he not expelled them from the Gar-
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den of Eden. You can’t explain what painlessness means except by using the 
concept of pain, and you can’t even experience painlessness as painlessness if 
you have had no experiences of pain. On the other hand – in ontological terms 
– one may argue that painlessness is “the default case.” or is “normal.” where-
as being in pain is “abnormal.” or a deficiency in the life of the sufferer.
It is worth adding that the existence of ambivalent contradictories does not 
by any means render the distinction between O-negative and O-positive predi-
cates or propositions “absurd” or superfluous as a whole. It rather just means 
that there is even more there to be elaborated, on account of the fact that we 
will need criteria to distinguish between cases where positive and negative 
make sense and cases where they do not. 
The second problem to be mentioned is that of molecular propositions. Take 
the following:
(18) Socrates is dead.
According to Russell “[t]his is partly a negative fact. To say that a person is 
dead is complicated. It is two statements rolled into one: ‘Socrates was alive’ 
and ‘Socrates is not alive’” (Russell 1956, 215, my italics). But he does not 
develop this point, which is a shame, since the very starting point of his logical 
atomism is that many (singular) propositions – most probably the majority – 
may turn out not to be atomic.  
The problem with molecular facts is not their complexity as such. As long as 
they are simple conjuncts of “atomic” facts the molecular fact is just the com-
ponents.19 But if we still take it as a principle, that from any proposition ‘A’ we 
may derive another proposition ‘¬A’ this other proposition will become a se-
ries of disjuncts, and disjunctive facts form a bullet that is not easy to bite. The 
negation of the proposition ‘Socrates is dead’ would, in case it were true, be 
made true by the “fact” that either Socrates was never alive (he might for in-
stance be a mythological figure) or he is (still) alive.20 
As we mentioned, Russell discusses other types of fact than those that are 
supposed to make a singular proposition true or false. One of them is “general 
facts.” another is “existence-facts.” as Russell calls them in order to emphasise 
that there are not merely general and existential propositions but also facts 
making them true or false (Russell 1956, 234–35). And as he himself points 
out, it is quite arbitrary whether such propositions are considered to be positive 
or negative (228–29). Propositions like ‘all men are mortal’ and ‘there exist 
67083-Danish Yearbook 47.indd   105 12/03/15   13.07
106 Carl erik kühl
blue fish’ may strike us as positive, whereas propositions like ‘no Greeks are 
monkeys’ and ‘there exist no unicorns’, on the face of it, i.e. according to their 
grammatical form, appear to be negative. But from the first chapters in any 
textbook in logic we know that a general proposition is logically equivalent to 
a proposition that denies the existence of something (‘all men are mortal’ is 
logically equivalent to ‘there exist no men that are not mortal’), and all existen-
tial claims deny a general proposition (‘there exist blue fish’ is equivalent to 
‘not all fish are not blue’). Russell strongly emphasises this, but at the same 
time he seems to ignore it too. His favourite example of a negative fact, “There 
is not a hippopotamus in this room.” may itself be obverted into “All hippo-
potami are not in [i.e. are outside] this room.” But the “psychological” effect 
may be different. In the latter case one imagines that the utterer knows how 
many hippopotami there are in the world, has checked them one by one and 
arrived at the conclusion that they are all to be found outside this room. In the 
first case there is just a glance around the room. The room is in some sense 
taken as the subject and the absence of the hippopotamus as the predicate: 
“This room is empty of hippopotami.” 
VIII. Negative facts
I think theorists generally share the intuition that there is a distinction between 
(ontologically) positive and negative propositions. We may, in some (or maybe 
many) cases disagree about where the line should be drawn, but given the exist-
ence of the distinction we may ask about the truthmakers for the propositions 
that occur on the negative side. And that is the question that most recent theo-
rists have concerned themselves with.21 So does this study of how negative 
propositions are to be defined have implications for that question – the ques-
tion, that is, of whether negative facts exist or not? This is a subject I intend to 
discuss in more detail in due course, in a subsequent paper,22 but it nevertheless 
seems appropriate to anticipate here some of the observations that most readily 
present themselves. 
If we take a look at the category of O-negative propositions that do have an 
ontological valence, I find it hard to deny that they, when true, are each made 
true by a negative fact in quite the same way as un-negated positive proposi-
tions, if true, are each made true by a positive fact. In some cases I wouldn’t 
even know what it would mean to deny this. I will mention just a couple of 
such cases.
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‘Pierre is not healthy’. This is a negative claim. Yet the absence of health 
means the presence of illness: i.e. the presence of symptoms and causes of 
symptoms. I find it odd to say that the occurrence of illness is less of a fact and 
“exists” in a different or even vaguer sense than the occurrence of health. 
What about the negative property of blindness?23 Whereas the absence of 
health is constituted by the presence of something else, blindness seems to be 
the sheer absence of something, viz. sightedness. Now, compare the following 
two sets of remarks: (1) “This is A. He is sighted. That’s a fact! Or in analytical 
philosophers’ terminology: the fact that he is sighted does exist.” (2) “And this 
is B. He is blind. That’s not a fact in the same sense as A’s being sighted. The 
fact that he is blind does not exist!” You are surely justified in wondering about 
the meaning of this comparison. You may feel yourself to be in a position 
somewhat similar to that of Aristotle, about whom it is said that when some-
body presented him with the Eleatic arguments against the existence of move-
ment he simply walked around. But why is it so? First, blindness can only be 
assigned to beings for whom the faculty of seeing is an attribute in virtue of 
their genus: for instance, human beings. A stone, a flower, or an earthworm 
cannot be blind. Next, you cannot be blind for just a few minutes. Your being 
blind must obtain for a significant part of your life – maybe your whole life – in 
order to be blindness. You are not blind unless you have been that way long 
enough to mean you are living the life of someone who is blind. In this sense 
B’s blindness is not less “real” than A’s sightedness. I would rather say that 
A’s sightedness impacts on his life in one way, and B’s blindness impacts on 
his life in another. There are even a lot of things B “positively” does, being 
blind, that A does not do, not being blind: he takes a walk using a white stick 
to help him find his way and to be recognised by other people in the street as 
blind, waits at the busy crossroads for somebody to help him cross the road, 
reads or writes a letter in Braille, etc.24
As has sometimes been noted, the discussion of the nature of causation might 
well have developed differently, had it not, since Hume, taken the behaviour of 
billiard balls as its paradigm case (Randall, 1960). Similarly, I think, the dis-
cussion of the existence of negative facts would have turned out differently, 
had it not been so concerned with the absence of hippopotami from lecture 
rooms, and with chalk not being red.
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Notes
 1 Just to be on the safe side, we should perhaps add that the problem of what defines the posi-
tivity/negativity of a proposition only arises when two propositions p and q make a pair of 
contradictories: i.e. when ‘p → ¬q’ and ‘¬p →q’: one of them, it is assumed, must be the 
positive, the other the negative. By contrast, although the proposition ‘Pierre is in Paris’ does 
contradict the proposition ‘Pierre is in Berlin’, the propositions don’t together make a pair of 
contradictories but, instead, a pair of contraries: i.e. ‘p → ¬q’ or (as logically equivalent) ‘q 
→¬p ’. 
 2 The principle merely holds for contingent truths and not when ‘S is not P’ by itself is a logical 
necessity. I owe this observation to Eline Busck Gundersen. 
 3 I shall mainly confine the present discussion to singular propositions.
 4 Another reason is that most often it will be the introduction of the negative valence that brings 
it about that it makes sense to talk about ‘negative’ and ‘positive’. The positive is a default (in 
which case you may question whether it deserves to be called ‘positive’), whereas the nega-
tive “opens up the dimension.” One may compare this to the case of rational and irrational 
numbers: the concept of rational numbers is not, of course, to be understood as the negation 
of irrational numbers, but it is the introduction of irrational numbers that leads to the very 
dichotomy of rational vs. irrational numbers and, in that sense, makes the rational numbers 
explicitly rational too. Similarly, it is the markedness of the term ‘woman’ that makes ‘man’ 
a gendered term.
 5 These are among Russell’s favourites. Another is ‘Socrates is not alive’. However, the logical 
structure of this proposition is not entirely unambiguous. Russell writes: “… it is simpler … 
to assume that ‘Socrates is not alive’ is really an objective fact in the same sense in which 
‘Socrates is human’ is a fact” (Russell 1956, 214). Apparently, he takes ‘alive’ to be a predi-
cate, and in his own terms the structure will be: ‘(∃x)(x is Socrates ∧ x is not alive)’. There 
is, however, an obvious alternative, which is to simply write ‘¬(∃x)(x is Socrates)’ and add 
a terminological footnote explaining that Socrates is a human being and that when we speak 
about human beings using our natural language – in  this case English – ‘exists’ is convention-
ally substituted by the expression ‘is alive’.
 6 We omit dogs, dishes, etc. 
 7 That is one of Russell’s arguments against Demos’ incompatibilism (Russell 1956, 213–14).
 8 Hobbes might disagree: war is natural, peace is constructed.
 9 For an analysis of the “acausality of the negative,” see Molnar 2000, 77.  
10 For a similar analysis, see Armstrong 2004, 64.
11 See ibid, 63–66.
12 For Sartre, “existential absence” is opposed to “formal absence.” which may reasonably be 
considered to be a variant of (what I have called) “sheer negativity.” (See Sartre 1969, 9–10.) 
I have slightly modified Sartre’s example (and his analytical point) for my own purposes.
13 As long as the proposition ‘there is dirt in the room’ is merely considered to be positive in the 
sheer sense, the dirt should not, strictly speaking, be called ‘dirt’, but ‘grease spots, particles 
of certain sorts, of a certain minimal size, in a certain minimal quantum, etc.’, instead.
14 ‘Pierre is playing in tune’ and ‘Pierre is playing out of tune’ are not contradictories since it is 
possible that Pierre is not playing at all. The negation of ‘Pierre is playing in tune’ goes ‘Pierre 
is playing out of tune or Pierre is not playing’ (exclusive disjunction). The XP-conditions 
(see p. ###) still hold: since Pierre exists and it is possible that he may not play in tune we get 
‘¬(Pierre is playing in tune)’, as equivalent to ‘Pierre is not playing-in-tune’, which in turn is 
not equivalent to ‘Pierre is playing-out-of-tune’. 
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15 Actually, only Kenny makes use of an inferential characterisation. 
16 A short description of the minimal understanding involved: lecturing is an activity in which 
one person (= the lecturer) tells something to many persons, all facing him (= the audience). 
Parts of what he tells are exclusively, primarily, or preferably, accessible as written or drawn 
(diagrams, formulas, drawings, surveys). Using the blackboard the lecturer enables the audi-
ence to share that access. One may further add that Russell’s lecture takes place in a “lecture 
culture” where the lecturer may base his presentation on the possibility of utilising such ac-
cess. (It is not necessary to understand the distinction between teaching a school class, giving 
a talk in a village hall, or lecturing in a lecture room at a university.) For a detailed demon-
stration of the close relationship between understanding the meanings of words (sentences, 
utterances) and understanding things (situations, the world), see Meløe 2005.
17 Well, there may be theological considerations regarding the signs connected with the valences 
if we are dealing with a human ‘he’ or ‘she’, but they don’t apply to monkeys.
18 In German you have ‘schmerz’ and ‘schmerzfrei’, where ‘-frei’ takes on the function of a 
negative suffix.
19 The term ‘atomic fact’ may be more or less pragmatically defined. An atomic fact may be 
considered to be a fact which, at a given moment, is not analysed further. This is already also 
Russell’s line of thought in 1922 (Russell 1988).
20 A possible solution: The proposition ‘A ∨ B’ is true iff: it is a fact that A and B or it is a fact 
that A and ¬B or it is a fact that ¬A and B. The disjunctive relationship between the three can-
didate facts does not make a fourth fact in its own right: a “meta-abstract fact,.” so to speak.
21 The problem of implementing the distinction between negative and positive truths may be 
greater for the disbeliever than for the believer in negative facts. If, with Russell, one thinks 
that “…Socrates is not alive’ is really an objective fact in the same sense in which ‘Socrates 
is human’ is a fact” (Russell, 214), then the question of classifying the particular statements 
as positive or negative is less crucial. The procedure, say, of truthmaking, will be the same no 
matter how the distinction is drawn.
22 Kühl, On the Existence and Reality of Negative Facts.
23 This is Aristotle’s example [of steresis]: “‘the absence of sight in one who by nature sees” 
(Aristotle, Physics, chapter 7). It  is also important since the property of blindness is consid-
ered by Molnar – as by me – to be a negative property (even though grammatically it may be 
expressed negatively, as ‘not sighted’, as well as positively, as ‘blind’) (Molnar 2000, 73). 
One may wonder how Aristotle’s (and his commentators’) analyses would have turned out if 
he (or they) had used ‘blind’ as the paradigm for negative predicates.
24 A sighted person may also read or write a letter in Braille, but then he is doing something dif-
ferent, since the point of what he is doing will be different. 
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